After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Western powers imposed unprecedented sanctions on the Kremlin. Much has been said about the impact of asset seizures, flight bans and financial restrictions, but the untold story of the West’s latest attempt to contain Russia is export controls. In a way, the United States and 37 other countries imposed novel and complex export control regimes on Russia. These regulations severely restrict exports to Russia of strategic technologies such as semiconductors, microelectronics, navigation equipment and aircraft parts. This is reminiscent of Western export controls that were so successful in isolating, containing, and finally defeating the Soviet Union.
Given the time, export controls will play a key role in undermining Russia’s defense industry and eroding its military capacity to wage war. Despite Moscow’s attempts to increase domestic self-sufficiency, including an import substitution program launched in 2015, Russian manufacturers remain highly dependent on foreign parts and machinery. Source these essential items elsewhere. Export controls are therefore a powerful tool to hamper Russia’s ability to replenish its depleting stockpile of arms and ammunition.
Sanctions and export controls, usually put together by non-professionals, have very different logics of operation. Unlike sanctions, which can halt trade and banking relationships almost immediately, export controls are softer tools aimed at reducing a target’s access to goods and technology. Export controls are seldom successful in stifling technology transfer outright, and rely on other means, such as achieving domestic production, circumventing restrictions via third countries, or receiving support from Western firms to defeat them. does not permanently prevent the target from catching up. Successful export controls therefore depend on the stringency of regulations, the uniqueness of each technology, and the concentration of the supply chain. As long as there are alternative suppliers in non-sanctioned countries such as China and India, the impact of export restrictions is weakened. International coordination is essential as unilateral export controls are rarely effective.
After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Western powers imposed unprecedented sanctions on the Kremlin. Much has been said about the impact of asset seizures, flight bans and financial restrictions, but the untold story of the West’s latest attempt to contain Russia is export controls. In a way, the United States and 37 other countries imposed novel and complex export control regimes on Russia. These regulations severely restrict exports to Russia of strategic technologies such as semiconductors, microelectronics, navigation equipment and aircraft parts. This is reminiscent of Western export controls that were so successful in isolating, containing, and finally defeating the Soviet Union.
Given the time, export controls will play a key role in undermining Russia’s defense industry and eroding its military capacity to wage war. Despite Moscow’s attempts to increase domestic self-sufficiency, including an import substitution program launched in 2015, Russian manufacturers remain highly dependent on foreign parts and machinery. Source these essential items elsewhere. Export controls are therefore a powerful tool to hamper Russia’s ability to replenish its depleting stockpile of arms and ammunition.
Sanctions and export controls, usually put together by non-professionals, have very different logics of operation. Unlike sanctions, which can halt trade and banking relationships almost immediately, export controls are softer tools aimed at reducing a target’s access to goods and technology. Export controls are seldom successful in stifling technology transfer outright, and rely on other means, such as achieving domestic production, circumventing restrictions via third countries, or receiving support from Western firms to defeat restrictions. does not permanently prevent the target from catching up. Successful export controls therefore depend on the stringency of regulations, the uniqueness of each technology, and the concentration of the supply chain. As long as there are alternative suppliers in non-sanctioned countries such as China and India, the impact of export restrictions is weakened. International coordination is essential as unilateral export controls are rarely effective.
Western allies had considerable experience in blocking the Soviet Union from accessing classified technology. At the start of the Cold War, Western powers used multilateral export controls to stop the flow of strategic goods and technology to the communist bloc and prevent them from gaining military advantage. Since then, the global technology landscape has changed significantly, but the core issue of export controls has not changed. How to balance national security and economic interests, how to share the rationale behind regulation with all participants, how to size it right, and more. How to make sure the control is managed efficiently, without having too narrow or too wide scope. During the Cold War, this was accomplished by national authorities working with the Multilateral Coordinating Committee for Export Control (commonly known as CoCom, which closed in 1994).
The new Western restrictions on Russia are the most comprehensive restrictions applied to a single country since the Cold War. Prior to the Russian invasion, existing export controls were primarily for a small number of advanced military equipment and dual-use technology and were not always strictly enforced. Now, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, Western powers have agreed to extend control well beyond the current multilateral export control regimes (Wassenaar Accord, Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group). . , all of which focus narrowly on weapons of mass destruction, non-proliferation, or specific arms embargoes.
New regulations for exports to Russia include four types of restrictions. First, it prohibits the export, re-export, and transfer of goods, software, or technology essential to Russia’s defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors. To amplify their effectiveness, these regulations also apply to Belarus, Russia’s close ally. Second, the United States, working with allies and partners, applied the so-called Foreign Direct Products Rule. This severely restricted Russia’s access to foreign-made products using US software and technology. Until now, the strict rules have only been imposed on Chinese telecom giant Huawei, not the entire country.
Third, a near-total embargo was put in place to prohibit the export of US-origin items to the Russian military. And fourth, over 100 entities, including Rostec and Sukhoi Aviation, have been added to the entity list compiled by the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security. Companies on the list will face broad sanctions that “restrict access to items necessary for Russia to exert its power and achieve its strategic ambitions.”
But the Kremlin has a long history of countering and evading sanctions. A recent report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) examined 27 of Russia’s most advanced military systems, including communications systems, cruise missiles, and electronic warfare equipment, and found that they contained at least 80 different components. rice field. Subject to US export controls. The report’s findings have several implications for the effectiveness of export controls.
First, Russia’s military-civilian fusion is no less worrisome than China’s. “Military-Civilian Fusion” is a term used by U.S. defense analysts to describe China as strengthening its military capabilities by systematically removing barriers between the defense industry and ostensibly civilian research institutes. refers to the national strategy of The collapse of the border between the military and civilian sectors is also a Russian phenomenon.
Russia has a long history of scientific and technological espionage. During the Soviet era, Moscow’s intelligence services targeted major Western computer and semiconductor companies, particularly in the United States and Japan, as part of an illegal procurement campaign. More recently, Russian research agencies have been actively involved in industrial espionage, redirecting critical items to the defense sector. For example, in April, a Russian scientist working at the University of Augsburg in Germany was convicted of passing information on European rocket propulsion technology to Russian intelligence. Thus, in the latest round of sanctions, the US has targeted a number of nominally private high-tech companies, including the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and the Skolkovo Foundation. The research institute actively cooperated with numerous Russian defense agencies such as Uralvagonzavod, the largest Russian tank producer. Almaz Antei is the country’s largest arms producer. United Aircraft Corporation, an aerospace and defense company.
Second, exempting consumer products is seen as a way to save the public, but it can backfire and undermine regulation. Belarusian businesses are eligible for the consumer technology exemption, including computers, memory devices, digital cameras, network access controllers, and software. One theory is that the spread of this technology in Russia will make it harder for the Russian government to control the messages that reach its citizens.
In information warfare, mitigating collateral damage to civilian Russians is important, but these exemptions can be exploited by Russia’s defense sector. The RUSI report shows how consumer semiconductors ended up as Russian weapons. In May, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimond reported that Russia appeared to be relying on microprocessors in dishwashers and refrigerators to replenish a dwindling chip supply for military hardware. Reusing the semiconductors for military purposes does not guarantee the highest quality weapons, but it does serve the purpose of causing the greatest chaos on the battlefield for the Russian military. By reusing programmable her chips, Russia’s use of consumer technology is effective in mitigating the impact of export controls.
Finally, transshipments from third-party suppliers are difficult to manage, making it difficult to completely stop the supply of critical items. If a particular technology cannot be geographically identified and controlled, it is only a matter of time before it is procured through a covert network of third-party jurisdictions. Russia reportedly uses offshore companies in jurisdictions such as Hong Kong and Vietnam to hide the ultimate end-user. Re-export of non-regulated goods is also a weakness. RUSI has assembled a long list of low-tech consumer goods repurposed for Russian weapons. These items can be shipped to Russia and Belarus unless specifically for military purposes. These items are particularly difficult to regulate because they are not on the Commerce Control List and require close tracking to ensure they are not being used improperly. Utilizing middlemen to divert components to military end users is a common tactic among desanctioners. It gets even easier when this involves technology that isn’t strictly confined to begin with.
The past success of export controls has shown that targets are well suited to impose higher hurdles to acquire specific technologies. Even if it moves slowly, it could become one of the most powerful tools in the Western economic policy toolbox. But the impact on Russia’s ability to wage war will not come automatically. We must constantly monitor, enforce strict enforcement, and adapt to Russia’s evolving adaptive tactics.
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